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My aim in this essay is to pair Kierkegaard with the German-born philosopher 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). I am particularly concerned to juxtapose their 
complementary investigations into the etiology and operation of resentment, 
which both thinkers identified as exerting a powerfully retardant force within the 
bourgeois societies of late modern European culture. Indeed, both were 
concerned to demonstrate the extent to which the corrosive power of resentment 
had transformed the religious injunction to “love thy neighbor” into a culturally 
sponsored program to “beggar thy neighbor.”  
The result of this pairing, or so I hope to demonstrate, is a productive 
division of philosophical labor: From Nietzsche, on the one hand, Kierkegaard’s 
readers may gain a clear sense of how a community founded on ressentiment 
may accommodate “healthy” expressions of comparative advantage and relative 
superiority. Even when exaggerated and amplified, however, these expressions 
pose no threat to the conservative, contractionary structure of the ethical life of 
the community in question. In particular, as we shall see, Nietzsche’s account of 
ressentiment may explain that, and why, the seemingly daring meditation 
conducted by Johannes de silentio in Fear and Trembling yields such a muddled 
and unsatisfying conclusion.  
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My aim in this essay is to pair Kierkegaard with the German-born philosopher 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). I am particularly concerned to juxtapose their 
complementary investigations into the etiology and operation of resentment, 
which both thinkers identified as exerting a powerfully retardant force within the 
bourgeois societies of late modern European culture. Indeed, both were 
concerned to demonstrate the extent to which the corrosive power of resentment 
had transformed the religious injunction to “love thy neighbor” into a culturally 
sponsored program to “beggar thy neighbor.”  
The result of this pairing, or so I hope to demonstrate, is a productive 
division of philosophical labor: From Nietzsche, on the one hand, Kierkegaard’s 
readers may gain a clear sense of how a community founded on ressentiment 
may accommodate “healthy” expressions of comparative advantage and relative 
superiority. Even when exaggerated and amplified, however, these expressions 
pose no threat to the conservative, contractionary structure of the ethical life of 
the community in question. In particular, as we shall see, Nietzsche’s account of 
ressentiment may explain that, and why, the seemingly daring meditation 
conducted by Johannes de silentio in Fear and Trembling yields such a muddled 
and unsatisfying conclusion.  
From Kierkegaard, on the other hand, Nietzsche’s readers may gain a 
usefully illustrative sketch of an individual divided irreparably against himself, 
laboring in the thrall of a social role and station that he can neither fully embrace 
nor finally renounce. The individual in question is none other than Johannes de 
silentio, the pseudonymous author and presumed narrator of Fear and 
Trembling. Kierkegaard’s sketch of Johannes invites us to assign a distinctly 
human face—or, at any rate, a distinctly human psyche—to the enigmatic figure 
of the ascetic priest. And although it may be tempting to equate the ascetic 
priest, as presented by Nietzsche, with the knight of morality, as presented by 
Kierkegaard, especially with respect to the complex role each plays in the 
community he is obliged to tend, it is sufficient for my purposes to note the family 
resemblance that obtains between these two pathological types.  
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Part One: Introducing the Knight of Morality 
I am particularly concerned in this essay to draw attention to Kierkegaard’s use of 
the literary device of pseudonymous authorship for a specific diagnostic 
purpose—namely, to construct a psychological profile of a particular kind (or 
type) of modern subject.  
In general, or so I wish to claim, Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms represent 
second-order reflections of the spiritual crisis he detects, wherein the accurate 
diagnosis of this crisis is seen—though not by the pseudonyms themselves—to 
manifest and feed this crisis rather than to address or alleviate it. We often find, 
moreover, that Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms deceive themselves about their 
relationship to the crisis they claim to diagnose. Rather than establish their 
distance from (or immunity to) the crisis in question, their common penchant for 
hyper-rational analysis and abstract diagnosis confirms their immersion in this 
crisis. That they are able to reflect on the spiritual failings of others is evidence 
not of their success in leading spiritually enriched lives, but of their failure to 
avoid the pandemic spiritual poverty they both expose and decry. What 
Kierkegaard both realizes and dramatizes, in short, is that diagnosing the 
spiritual illness of others, as his pseudonyms are inclined to do, can be a 
powerful symptom of this illness in oneself.1 
We often find, moreover, that the pseudonyms unwittingly bespeak, or 
manifest, a structural element of the spiritual crisis they seek to document. For 
example, Kierkegaard employs the figure of Johannes de silentio, the 
pseudonymous author of Fear and Trembling, to dramatize the enduring 
purchase of morality, broadly construed, on the lives of educated, progressive, 
urbane, high-functioning, and seemingly self-possessed modern agents. Even as 
he belittles those who cling to the banal clichés of conventional morality, 
Johannes unknowingly demonstrates the extent of his own involuntary 
investments in the ethical sphere of existence. Despite his avowed intention to 
weigh the merits of a “teleological suspension of the ethical” (FT 54),2 for 
example, he is able, in the end, to do no such thing. As he reaches the limits of 
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this thought-experiment, he recoils from the faith of Abraham and relaxes into the 
comprehensive totality of the ethical universal. As we shall see, the universal 
validity of the ethical law not only ensures the comfort, stability, and efficiency of 
the bourgeois society to which Johannes belongs, but also allows him to express 
his resentment of Abraham and anyone else who genuinely (as opposed to half-
heartedly) attempts to “go further.”3  
In particular, as we shall see, Johannes exemplifies a psychological type 
that Kierkegaard associates with a (bourgeois) culture in which one is 
encouraged to limit one’s sense of spiritual flourishing to the attainment and 
celebration of petty advantages over others. In such a culture, we learn, the 
emphasis is laid not on an absolute standard of excellence or flourishing, but on 
a comparative or relative standard. One judges one’s condition and progress, 
that is, by comparing oneself to others. The problem with a comparative standard 
of flourishing, however, is that it provides an incentive not only to build oneself 
up, but also to tear others down. We thus notice, for example, that Johannes 
regularly makes snide, offhand observations about his contemporaries, to whom 
he clearly believes himself superior. In addition to his potentially admirable labors 
of spiritual enrichment, that is, he is actively engaged in a campaign to ridicule 
and belittle his contemporaries. 
This latter point is complicated by the likely accuracy of his observations. 
In other words, Johannes is clearly onto something when he rebukes his 
contemporaries for their materialism, their philistinism, and their breezy sense of 
entitlement to the faith they thoughtlessly claim for themselves. Indeed, we know 
from those writings to which Kierkegaard affixed his own signature—e.g., A 
Literary Review—that he shares many of the dissatisfactions voiced by 
Johannes.  
Still, one may wonder why Johannes is so preoccupied, even obsessed, 
with the spiritual failings of his contemporaries. While it is no doubt true, as he 
alleges, that baldly asserting one’s claim to faith can be symptomatic of spiritual 
crisis, the same might be said of devoting one’s energies to tracking and 
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debunking such assertions. Indeed, he presents his own efforts at spiritual 
enrichment, like his silence, as belonging to the past, as if they were either 
completed or indefinitely suspended. In his new role, as doomsayer and scold, 
he concerns himself with the spiritual struggles and failings of others, to whom he 
favorably compares himself. Rather than attend to his own impoverished 
spirituality, in fact, Johannes busies himself with his occasionally insightful 
reckonings of the real and imagined failings of his contemporaries. In doing so, 
he secures for himself transient experiences of artificially enhanced passion, 
which he then wishfully misinterprets as signs of his surging vitality. He asserts 
(and mistakenly believes) that these transient bursts of passion separate him 
decisively from his enervated contemporaries. 
For the most part, this celebration of petty advantages is either comic or 
pathetic. We encounter Johannes in exuberantly fine form, for example, when he 
skewers the pretensions and lampoons the manners of his contemporaries. But 
this jaunty aspect of his narration also reveals a deeper, and potentially troubling, 
unease. As we shall see, Johannes is not content simply to take the measure of 
his laughable contemporaries. He also presents himself as the measure and 
judge of Abraham, despite claiming, repeatedly, that the greatness of Abraham 
defies all human metrics. Despite failing to place Abraham in the various 
categories he proposes for consideration—including those of hero, ironist, knight 
of faith, intellectual tragic hero, etc.—Johannes nevertheless manages to invite 
an ethical indictment of the patriarch, who apparently failed to disclose to Isaac 
the true objective of their journey to Mt. Moriah. As we shall see, Johannes 
presents this failure as sufficient to authorize our resentment of Abraham and to 
renounce our allegiance to him as a moral exemplar.  
Johannes thus appears in Fear and Trembling as what I call, though 
Kierkegaard does not, a knight of morality: Despite the various challenges he 
presents to the primacy of ethical universality, he reflexively defends the priority 
of the ethical sphere of existence and the validity of the moral law.4 He does so, 
as we shall see, to satisfy two pathological (and uniquely modern) needs: 1) his 
need to be recognized as superior to his vulgar, faithless contemporaries; and 2) 
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his need to present himself as the measure and judge of Abraham, whose faith 
prevents him from enjoying the experience of happiness that awaits him and his 
favored readers in the revitalized ethical sphere.  
In presenting Johannes as manifesting these particular needs, 
Kierkegaard thus exposes the extent to which the ethical sphere of existence 
cultivates for its laws and norms an appreciative and ultimately uncritical 
clientele. Despite the many material benefits it confers, we learn, the ethical 
sphere of existence leaves nothing to chance in securing the allegiance of its 
clientele: Those whom it recruits as its knightly defenders are rewarded for their 
fidelity with the opportunity to measure themselves against others and to mark 
their superiority with authorized expressions of power and violence.5 As 
compensation for his own loyalty to the moral law, Johannes is allowed not only 
to rail with impunity against his dispirited contemporaries, but also to stand in 
judgment of Abraham, whom he dares to dislodge from the pedestal on which he 
stands.  
Part Two: The Slave Revolt in Morality 
Nietzsche’s influential account of the slave revolt in morality turns, perhaps 
surprisingly, on his recognition of the potentially creative power of resentment: 
The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes 
creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of natures that are 
denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves 
with an imaginary revenge. While every noble morality develops from 
a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says 
No to what is “outside,” what is “different” what is “not itself”; and this 
No is its creative deed. This inversion of the value-positing eye—this 
need to direct one’s view outward instead of back to oneself—is of the 
essence of ressentiment: in order to exist, slave morality always 
needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, 
external stimuli in order to act at all—its action is fundamentally 
reaction. (GM I:10)6 
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Nietzsche famously neglects to offer his readers a proper definition of 
ressentiment. He also refuses, perhaps with good reason, to translate the word 
into his native German. Although he no doubt benefited rhetorically from the 
elasticity of an undefined term of apparently technical application, his readers are 
understandably keen to receive a more precise formulation. For our purposes, 
Max Scheler’s definition should suffice:  
Ressentiment is a self-poisoning of the mind which has quite definite 
causes and consequences. It is a lasting mental attitude, caused by 
the systematic repression of certain emotions and affects which, as 
such, are normal components of human nature. Their repression leads 
to the constant tendency to indulge in certain kinds of value delusions 
and corresponding value judgments. The emotions and affects 
primarily concerned are revenge, hatred, malice, envy, the impulse to 
detract, and spite.7 
As such, ressentiment names the propensity of the “slave” type to repudiate 
everything that it is not, as a means of generating affect and thereby distracting 
itself from its lack of an integrated identity. Although the “noble man” too is 
susceptible to ressentiment, in him it “consummates and exhausts itself in an 
immediate reaction,” i.e., before it accumulates and becomes toxic to him (GM 
I:10).8  
As is his wont, Nietzsche offers a fairly reductive physiological account of 
the role and utility of ressentiment in the vital economy of the human animal 
organism. His idea, in brief, is that the accumulation and explosive discharge of 
ressentiment enables suffering and otherwise impotent individuals to gain relief 
from their pain. In the context of developing what amounts to a pioneering 
diagnosis of depression, he explains,   
Every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering; more 
exactly, an agent9; still more specifically, a guilty agent who is 
susceptible to suffering—in short, some living thing upon which he 
can, under some pretext or other, vent his affects, actually or in effigy: 
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for the venting of his affects represents the greatest attempt on the 
part of the sufferer to win relief, anesthesia—the narcotic he cannot 
help desiring to deaden pain of any kind. This alone, I surmise, 
constitutes the actual physiological cause of ressentiment…: a desire 
to deaden pain by means of affects. (GM III:15) 
Nietzsche thus identifies the accumulation and discharge of ressentiment as a 
natural (if crude) internal mechanism for anaesthetizing oneself. In seeking to 
vent their copious ressentiment, that is, the slaves had no reasonable 
expectation of actually confronting, much less prevailing over, their healthy 
oppressors. (As Nietzsche notes in the extracted passage above, an effigy often 
would suffice.) They hoped simply to deaden their pain and looked no further into 
their future. Their oppressors, whether real or imagined, furnished them with a 
proximate target and a guiding pretext for an analgesic discharge of 
ressentiment.  
 As we have seen, both Nietzsche and Scheler emphasize the sheer 
toxicity of ressentiment, which functions essentially as an endogenic poison. This 
means that even when its discharge succeeds in relieving pain, ressentiment 
debilitates and sickens the sufferer in question. As such, it can be considered a 
remedy or cure only in an extremely restricted sense. In short, the discharge of 
ressentiment makes no one better; it simply allows the sick to feel better and, so, 
to endure their suffering. Why, then, does Nietzsche attribute the success of the 
slave revolt in morality to the creative, value-generative power of ressentiment? 
Under what conditions does such a toxic affect become anything but corrosive? 
According to Nietzsche, the priest accomplished this alchemical feat by 
redirecting (and repurposing) the slaves’ abundant ressentiment. Prior to the 
priest’s intervention, or so we are meant to understand, the accumulation of 
ressentiment in the lower orders of society was bothersome for the nobles and 
potentially fatal for the slaves. So long as the slaves vented their ressentiment 
toward the nobles, they risked either provoking a response they would not 
survive, or drawing attention to themselves as easy targets of retaliatory and 
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gratuitous abuse. As a solution to the problem of the unruly slaves, the knightly 
nobles appointed the priestly nobles to quell the lower orders. They were able to 
prevail over the priests, apparently, by virtue of their superior physical power and 
force, which the priestly nobles would have been foolish to test (GM I:7). This 
does not mean, however, that the priestly nobles accepted or reconciled 
themselves to their demotion to second-class status among the nobles. They 
seethed in silence, feeding their hatred of the knightly nobles while plotting their 
revenge. 
Nietzsche is primarily concerned here to document the ministry conducted 
by one particular kind of priest: the ascetic priest, who persuaded the slaves to 
vent their ressentiment not toward the knightly nobles, but toward themselves. 
He did so by convincing them to find themselves responsible for their suffering 
and, subsequently, to implement an exacting regimen of self-surveillance (GM 
III:15). Scanning their barren souls for signs of unpaid debts and broken 
promises, the slaves acquired a knack for the kind of introspection that prepared 
them to cultivate the quiet virtues of patience, obedience, cooperation, and 
perseverance.  
Under the supervision of the ascetic priest, the slaves were molded into a 
productive and docile social collective, which Nietzsche affectionately calls the 
herd. As members of this collective, the slaves became proficient in almsgiving, 
mutual aid and support, reciprocal caretaking, and various rote mechanical tasks. 
(Nietzsche identifies these as the “innocent” methods employed by the priest to 
dull the suffering of the slaves.)  These miserable sufferers were thus granted the 
opportunity to identify themselves with the rising fortunes of the collective, which 
was a welcome distraction from their dim prospects as individuals. 
In this form, moreover, the slaves no longer disturbed the knightly nobles, 
who, in turn, expressed little interest in the measures employed by the priest to 
quell the lower orders. Had they paid closer attention, the knightly nobles might 
have observed, and taken note of, the following stroke of genius on the part of 
the ascetic priest:   
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 [B]y prescribing “love of the neighbor,” the ascetic priest prescribes 
fundamentally an excitement of the strongest, most life-affirming drive, 
even if in the most cautious doses—namely, of the will to power. The 
happiness of “slight superiority,” involved in all doing good, being 
useful, helping, and rewarding, is the most effective means of 
consolation for the physiologically inhibited, and widely employed by 
them when they are well advised: otherwise they hurt one another, 
obedient, of course, to the same basic instinct…With the growth of the 
community, a new interest grows for the individual, too, and often lifts 
him above the most personal element in his discontent, his aversion to 
himself…(GM III:18, emphasis added) 
What the priest discovered, in short, is that a social collective formed and 
bound by (redirected) ressentiment may accommodate modest expenditures of 
the will to power, which in turn imbues the agents in question with “the happiness 
of ‘slight superiority’.” This means that a collective formed strictly for defensive 
(including self-defensive) purposes eventually may foster in its members positive 
feelings of attachment and accomplishment. It will do so, Nietzsche suggests, if 
the members of the collective are allowed (or indirectly encouraged) to look down 
on those whom they help and to engage in modest competition with other 
neighbor-lovers and almsgivers. In addition to doing good, that is, members of 
the collective will come to feel (relatively) good about themselves.  
Prior to the redirection of their ressentiment, the slaves experienced their 
suffering as gratuitous, senseless, undeserved, and as an objection to their 
existence. Following the redirection of their ressentiment, the slaves experienced 
their suffering as meaningful, deserved, indicative of their core goodness, and, 
so, as a seduction to life. Knowing themselves to be at fault, they eagerly set out 
to discover the source of their suffering, which they invariably located in the 
animal residuum they shared in common with the knightly nobles, i.e., in their 
drives, impulses, passions, appetites, and affects. As they became accustomed 
to this ascetic regimen, their sense of their own worth, qua herd members, 
gradually acquired a positive characterization.  
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In re-directing the ressentiment of his followers, we might note, the priest 
simply adjusted their natural mechanism for anaesthetizing themselves. Their 
inward discharge of ressentiment served the same purpose as an outward 
discharge, mobilizing a “violent emotion” to “deaden…a tormenting, secret pain 
that is becoming unendurable.” The fact that the slaves were not actually to 
blame for their suffering posed no real problem for the priest, who apparently 
understood that slaves only ever sought imaginary revenge. In that event, one 
convincing pretext—e.g., the slaves are to blame—would be as good as 
another—e.g., the nobles are to blame. As we have seen, moreover, their inward 
discharge of ressentiment also served to obviate the potentially mortal risks 
involved in an outward discharge directed at the nobles. The slaves were better 
off poisoning themselves than desperately taunting the cruelty-inclined nobles. 
In perfecting this adjustment in his followers, the priest also discovered 
that their need for anesthesia was so great that it trumped even their fear of 
death. Until he intervened, after all, they were fully prepared to vent their 
ressentiment against their actual oppressors, despite knowing that any such 
discharge would be likely to provoke a fatal, retaliatory response. The priest thus 
surmised that his followers would hazard their own annihilation if they believed 
that doing so would relieve their suffering. This means, as he no doubt observed 
and filed away for future reference, that they might be persuaded, under certain 
circumstances, to activate and express their will to nothingness, i.e., their will 
never to will again. As we shall see, this realization would eventually allow the 
priest to transform his peaceful ministry into a vehicle of revenge. 
The significance of this achievement can scarcely be overstated. In 
redirecting the ressentiment of the slaves, the ascetic priest saved them from 
their own imprudent impulses, quieted their rancor, tasked them with esteem-
building projects of self-improvement, and created a stable, viable collective. In 
doing so, of course, the priest also positioned himself to seek and gain his 
revenge. What the priest understood, apparently, is that ressentiment is always 
corrosive, even when redirected and repurposed in support of the day-to-day 
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maintenance of a docile collective. In the case of the herd, the destructive effects 
of redirected ressentiment are masked by its countervailing analgesic effects.  
Thus we see that the neighbor-love prescribed by the priest and perfected 
by the herd is motivated by, and laced with, neighbor-contempt. For Nietzsche, of 
course, this constitutes no objection to the limited, contextualized practice of 
neighbor-love: Those sufferers who receive neighbor-love are grateful for the 
attention and succor, and those who bestow neighbor-love enjoy “the happiness 
of ‘slight superiority’” they derive from looking down on their unfortunate 
beneficiaries. In general, we might say, the priest’s genius lay in his knack for 
determining the optimal dosage of ressentiment and other strong affects. This is 
important to bear in mind, for, as we shall see, the priest eventually would have 
the occasion to increase the dosage and thereby deliver an ecstatic experience 
of happiness.  
Nietzsche’s analysis is useful to us for several reasons. First of all, he 
explains that and how the affect of ressentiment may be redirected and 
repurposed to contribute to the formation of a stable, tranquil social collective. 
Second, he exposes the prescription of “neighbor-love” as a useful pretext for 
establishing relationships of relative or comparative advantage, which in turn 
facilitate the achievement of what he calls the “happiness of ‘slight superiority’.” 
Third, he reveals that the herd was formed to quell the rancor emanating from the 
unruly lower orders of an aristocratic society. As a degenerate form of social 
organization, that is, the herd was never meant to stage the kind of social 
experimentation that is most likely to contribute to the production of exotic human 
beings, which according to Nietzsche, is the business of politics. Fourth, 
Nietzsche’s analysis alerts us to the invisible role of ressentiment in forming and 
preserving the particular kind of community that has become increasingly 
common throughout the societies of late modern European culture. He thus 
positions us to understand, for example, that “the happiness of ‘slight 
superiority’,” which is both expressed and recommended by Johannes de 
silentio, is fully consistent with an underlying structure (and dynamic) of 
ressentiment. As we shall see, in fact, the comparative advantage Johannes 
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claims for himself is indicative of the conservative nature of the challenge he 
poses to himself and his readers.  
Part Three:  Morality and its Discontents  
Johannes de silentio opens Fear and Trembling by introducing himself to his 
readers.  No longer able to keep his eponymous silence, he feels compelled to 
report the spiritual crisis at hand. In the process of introducing himself, he also 
contrasts himself—and, by extension, the members of his target audience—with 
his nameless, faceless contemporaries, whom he ridicules for their uncritical, 
herdlike embrace of modern ideas. His Preface in fact offers a series of witty, 
biting observations of his contemporaries, in comparison to whom he is meant to 
appear both knowing and discerning. He is in fact superior to his contemporaries, 
as are those readers whom his Preface is meant to flatter. 
Let us begin by reviewing a representative sampling of the critical 
observations found in the Preface to Fear and Trembling: 
Not only in the business world but also in the world of ideas, our age 
stages ein wirklicher Ausverkauf [a real sale]. Everything can be had 
at such a bargain price that it becomes a question whether there is 
finally anyone who will make a bid…(FT 5) 
Every speculative monitor who conscientiously signals the important 
trends in modern philosophy, every assistant professor, tutor, and 
student, every rural outsider and tenant incumbent in philosophy is 
unwilling to stop with doubting everything but goes further…(FT 5) 
In our age, everyone is unwilling to stop with faith but goes further. It 
perhaps would be rash to ask where they are going, whereas it is a 
sign of urbanity and culture for me to assume that everyone has faith, 
since otherwise it certainly would be odd to speak of going further... 
(FT 7) 
The present author…writes because to him it is a luxury that is all the 
more pleasant and apparent the fewer there are who buy and read 
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what he writes. He easily envisions his fate in an age that has crossed 
out passion in order to serve science…(FT 7) 
Respectfully, Johannes de silentio (FT 8) 
What are we to make of this aggressively buoyant mode of self-
presentation? The first thing we note is that Johannes introduces himself in the 
Preface as a throwback, an anachronism. By his own admission, he is a stranger 
to the newfangled “System” of philosophy, an aspiring poet and lyricist in an age 
of gossip and newspapers, a would-be knight in an increasingly cynical, post-
heroic world, and an unabashed champion of passion in an age that has 
surrendered its depleted soul to science (FT 7-8). This is a rhetorical gambit that 
Kierkegaard later employs productively under his own signature in A Literary 
Review. He presents himself there as longing for the passion and drama of the 
Age of Revolution but obliged, sadly, to navigate the swampy decadence of the 
Present Age. On the strength of this distancing gesture, both Johannes and 
Kierkegaard lay claim to the detached, ironic perspective of the outsider inside, 
the droll critic who pretends not to fathom the depths of an age he knows at a 
glance to be superficial. At least in the case of Johannes, moreover, this claim is 
not simply an act or a ruse. As we shall see, Johannes is very much a throwback: 
As an unwitting knight of morality, he labors to enliven an age that no longer 
believes in passion, much less avenging knights.    
Second, we might note that these humorous comparisons with his 
contemporaries, and with his age in general, are also meant to establish the 
priority of Johannes’s own critical standpoint. In short, he intimates, he is not to 
be confused with his dull, obtuse, lifeless contemporaries. Unlike them, he does 
not mistake the swindle for the bargain, the material for the spiritual, or the 
inessential for the essential. Nor will he suffer passing fads and fashions to 
distract him from what he immodestly presents as the task of a lifetime. Whereas 
his contemporaries claim to “go further” than faith, he knows better. The faith 
they claim for themselves is barely deserving of the name, much less of the 
distinction they attach to it. Whatever his own failings may be, that is, Johannes 
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does not pretend to have gone further than faith. (He repeats this claim one final 
time at the end of FT.) He thus endeavors to establish the priority of his critical 
perspective not simply (or even primarily) on its own merits, but also in 
comparison to the claims of those who favor modern ideas over his anachronistic 
preoccupation with passion, faith, spirit, and resoluteness. The problem, as we 
shall see, is that his efforts to discredit their perspective have a tendency to 
eclipse his efforts to defend his own.  
Third, Johannes wishes to target a particular audience. Although he plays 
the Preface for laughs, exaggerating to comic effect his outsider status, he 
clearly wishes to distinguish himself, and decisively so, from his contemporaries. 
He thus tailors his introduction of himself to appeal to those readers who are 
similarly unfashionable, out of step with their age, suspicious of the “System,” 
perhaps even longing for a bygone age replete with quests, ideals, knights, 
heroes, lifelong trials, and enduring obligations. In other words, his is a 
conservative, retrospective approach, which promises to reckon the spiritual 
costs of a steady diet of modern ideas. Johannes thus presents himself, by way 
of contrast, as a man of irrepressible passion and, so, as an advertisement for 
the way of life to which he pledges his allegiance.  
Kindred critics and fellow skeptics of modernity may be intrigued, and 
perhaps even flattered, to be implicated in his witty takedown of the breezy, 
know-it-all strivers who claim to have “gone further” than faith. Those readers 
who find themselves attracted by this approach also may expect to enjoy a 
similar position of superiority vis-à-vis their dispassionate contemporaries. Like 
Johannes, that is, they may revel in expressing the neighbor-contempt that funds 
“the happiness of ‘slight superiority’.” Readers like these, I offer, are meant to 
form the community that Johannes later will endeavor to mobilize.  
At the same time, however, the Preface also confirms that Johannes is 
dependent on his lamentable contemporaries, bound up with their minimal 
successes and obvious failures. By virtue of his appeal to a comparative 
standard of spiritual flourishing, he not only needs his contemporaries, but also 
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needs them to remain relatively contemptible. (As Nietzsche said of the slave 
morality, that is, Johannes needs a “hostile external world” that he may vilify.) As 
he repeatedly admits, after all, he lacks the faith that he seemingly recommends 
to others. What he has to offer, in fact, is not a first-hand account or defense of 
the faith that his age allegedly has misplaced, but an enlightened understanding 
of the paradox of faith and a measured appreciation of the achievement that faith 
represents for others. He is content, that is, to situate himself in the vicinity or 
neighborhood of faith and to invite his readers to accompany him on his 
imaginative journeys to the scene of Abraham’s trial. 10  He does so, moreover, 
with an obvious sense of pride in the (relative) daring that supposedly launches 
these flights of fancy.  
Of all the figures in the biblical story of the Akedah, in fact, the one whom 
Johannes most closely resembles is Eliezer, the faithful servant whom Abraham 
strands at the foot of Mt. Moriah. Like Eliezer, Johannes travels a long way to 
Moriah as he imaginatively revisits the scene of Abraham’s trial. As such, or so 
Johannes seems to believe, he, like Eliezer, deserves significant credit for his 
efforts. Although he most certainly does not accompany Abraham and Isaac to 
the terrifying summit of Mt. Moriah, his imaginative journeys allow him to “go 
further” than his contemporaries.11 Unlike them, he at least takes seriously the 
trial, the drama, and the anxiety that he associates with the journey to Moriah. He 
thus looks down on his contemporaries, who, he believes, cannot place 
themselves in the vicinity of the faith of Abraham.  
In fact, however, this is an extremely difficult case for Johannes to make. 
His unlikely hero Eliezer is but a servant, and he, Johannes, is but a voyeur of 
faith. Unable to claim for himself the faith that would separate him decisively from 
his contemporaries, he can at best advert to a relative superiority or comparative 
advantage over them. In the end, that is, Johannes represents (and defends) an 
option, a strategy, a way of life, a point of view, which is valuable and worthwhile 
only in relative terms. He is better off than his contemporaries, or so he claims, 
but he is not a man of faith. As an adamant non-believer, in fact, Johannes 
strives simply to elevate himself above his contemporaries.  
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Does he go far enough? He seems to think so, though he never quite gets 
around to posing this question directly to himself. So long as he may look down 
on his contemporaries and lampoon their foibles, he need not acknowledge 
(much less address) his own failings. That he does not have faith is treated not 
so much as a shortcoming on his part, which would merit his or our renewed 
attention, but as a non-negotiable condition of his existence. He thus sidesteps 
an obvious line of criticism that he or someone else might pursue in evaluating 
his claim to “the happiness of ‘slight superiority’.”  
Like the Philippians to whom Paul’s letter is addressed, Johannes is on his 
own. All he has to go on is his own capacity for “fear trembling,” which he is 
understandably inclined to measure out for himself in manageable doses. He is 
willing to “fear and tremble,” that is, but only to an extent and for a duration that 
he determines to be adequate. After all, what kind of God would wish for him to 
suffer any more than is needed to secure his salvation? To be sure, some, like 
Johannes’ s contemporaries, choose minimal suffering or none at all. (This is 
why he looks down on them.) Others, like the saints and martyrs of yore, left 
nothing to chance. Abraham, we know, was willing to sacrifice “his best” for his 
faith.  
Johannes himself plots a sensible middle course between these extremes. 
Just as he is willing to enter the vicinity of faith, to get close enough, but no 
closer, to the center of its engulfing intensity, so is he prepared to “fear and 
tremble” just enough to secure his salvation—but no more. In the absence of an 
objective standard or reproducible calculus, he thus resolves to struggle more 
acutely, and more sincerely, than his contemporaries. If anyone from his age or 
generation merits salvation, he reasonably might have concluded, he will be the 
one. According to Kierkegaard, of course, one’s salvation is not simply a matter 
of playing it safe, meeting relative standards, holding reasonable beliefs, and 
forming sensible expectations.   
But there is another problem with his appeal to a strictly comparative 
standard of human flourishing: He may improve his relative position either by 
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building himself up, which he claims with some plausibility to have done, or by 
tearing others down. What this means, of course, is that Johannes has an 
incentive to see and describe his contemporaries in the least flattering light. As 
we have seen, moreover, he is in an advantageous position to belittle their 
achievements, stereotype their customs and manners, caricature their goals and 
aspirations, and generally discount the intensity of their spiritual struggles. This 
incentive furthermore places us, his readers, in a precarious position, for we are 
uniquely dependent on him to provide a more-or-less accurate reckoning of his 
contemporaries. His claim to a position of relative superiority rests on this 
reckoning, as does the validity of his diagnosis of the crisis at hand. In this sense, 
we simply may know too much about him to yield to his attempts at flattery. His 
claim to relative superiority may in fact be a disguised or redirected expression of 
resentment, just as Nietzsche has advised us. The same may be true, as we 
shall see, of his suspicions of Abraham.  
But what of his apparent campaign to recommend the faith of Abraham as 
a remedy for the torpor that grips his dispassionate contemporaries? What is the 
point of re-acquainting his readers with the prospect of a “teleological suspension 
of the ethical” and an “absolute duty to God”?  
Johannes may be something of a throwback, but he is no fool. He has no 
intention of forfeiting the safety and security of the ethical sphere for the terrifying 
uncertainty of a religious sphere in which an inscrutable deity issues adventitious 
commands. He does not possess the faith of Abraham, as he repeatedly tells us, 
and he is furthermore determined never to do so. Although he recommends that 
his readers reconsider the faith of Abraham, he does so not because he wants or 
expects them to aspire to it, much less achieve it. His aim, unlike his rhetoric, is 
far more modest: He believes that a reconsideration of the biblical story will 
endow his best readers with sufficient passion, vitality, and urgency to secure 
their comparative advantage over their contemporaries. In fact, I wish to suggest, 
Johannes aims both to draw our attention to the faith of Abraham and to place it 
off limits. He does this, moreover, for us, his favored readers, so that we may be 
enlivened but not endangered by our consideration of the terrifying faith of 
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Abraham. As we shall see, moreover, he also does this for himself, so that we 
will do his bidding. 
Notwithstanding its ominous and ostensibly disruptive presentation, the 
faith of Abraham is actually an extremely safe goal for Johannes to propose to 
his readers—or so he presumes. The setting of the goal, and its subsequent 
contemplation by the readers of Fear and Trembling, will infuse the ethical 
sphere with a degree of passion that is both salutary and stable. Despite 
Johannes’s stated fears about the possibility of a “teleological suspension of the 
ethical,” he does not really believe that his contemporaries are capable of 
choosing, much less sustaining, the religious obligations that he associates with 
Abraham. The reasonable limits of the ethical sphere will remain intact, while the 
ethical sphere itself will receive a welcome injection of non-threatening passion 
and vitality. In short, Johannes believes, he and his readers will enjoy the best of 
both spheres.12   
Despite Johannes’s rhetoric, then, the economy of his meditation on 
Abraham is surprisingly tame and conservative.  The book Fear and Trembling is 
meant to rouse our passions, but only to a degree that is consistent with the 
renewed legitimacy of the ethical sphere. The psychological appeal of 
Johannes’s meditation on Abraham is similarly conservative. Although he 
entertains the possibility of a precipitous leap into faith, by means of which one 
might accomplish a “teleological suspension of the ethical” and distinguish 
oneself as a “knight of faith,” he does so only to stir the sluggish vitality of his 
readers.  
This is why his imaginary journeys to the scene of Abraham’s trial, which 
his readers are encouraged to reproduce, never reach the sacrificial summit of 
Mt. Moriah. As we have seen, his goal all along has been to place himself and 
his readers in the vicinity or neighborhood of faith, so that he and they might bask 
in its nourishing intensity without taking on the burden of its attendant obligations. 
So although Johannes urges his readers to consider the faith of Abraham, he 
neither wants nor expects them to attain or even strive for it. He wishes simply to 
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pique their interest, to quicken their pulse, and to race their passions. That is all. 
Once he has succeeded in enlivening his readers, or so we are meant to believe, 
Johannes will return Abraham to the hazy, quasi-mythical oblivion where he 
ordinarily resides.   
The important point of comparison is this: The ascetic priest and the knight 
of morality both believe that their social roles authorize them to serve as 
diagnosticians and healers. Each responds to a situation of crisis by prescribing 
a potentially toxic remedy to an imperiled (and impaired) clientele. Each does so, 
moreover, fully (but undeservedly) confident in his capacity to determine the 
optimal dose of the remedy he prescribes. Each does so, finally, while operating 
under the unacknowledged burden of a conflict of interest. Just as the ascetic 
priest hopes to gain revenge on his sworn enemies, which leads him to mobilize 
the docile herd he has formed, so Johannes wishes to remove himself and his 
readers from the oppressive shadow of Abraham. Owing to this conflict of 
interest, finally, each cannot help but undo his good works on behalf of his 
clientele. 
Part Four: The Return of the Priest 
As we know, Nietzsche’s account of the slave revolt in morality does not end with 
his explanation of the formation of the herd. The development of the herd 
satisfied the most immediate need facing the priest and the slaves—namely, the 
need to determine a more productive use and direction for the slaves’ 
ressentiment. But the priest also had needs of his own, which he endeavored to 
satisfy, albeit indirectly, by mobilizing the herd.13  
In forming the herd, we recall, the priest restricted himself to his “innocent” 
methods for relieving the suffering of his followers. These methods, which 
included the therapies associated with almsgiving, neighbor love, and rote 
mechanical tasks, required the priest to fashion the simplest of pretexts: His 
followers suffered because they deserved to suffer, owing to deeds they had 
done in the past, deeds for which they had not yet fully atoned. As we have seen, 
moreover, this simple pretext secured the conditions under which some herd 
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members came to enjoy “the happiness of ‘slight superiority’,” which was a 
product (or by-product) of the slave’s redirected ressentiment.  
In mobilizing the herd, however, the priest would need to craft a more 
ambitious pretext, which, he surmised, would need to deliver a more memorable 
experience of happiness. The priest thus returned to the herd and intervened 
once again.14 The pretext he fashioned was both familiar and daring. He once 
again assured his followers that they suffered because they deserved to suffer, 
which once again allowed them to accept their suffering as meaningful. This time 
around, however, the priest convinced them that they suffered not on account of 
anything they had done, but on account of what (or who) they were: sinners. 
The secret of the priest’s success thus lay in his invention of sin, which 
Nietzsche describes as “the greatest event so far in the history of the sick soul” 
(GM III:20). This invention authorized his followers to search within themselves 
for the real or root cause of their suffering. Scanning their barren souls with 
renewed gusto, they not only encountered the broken promises and unpaid debts 
that were familiar to them, but also discovered the flawed and fallen nature that 
explained the persistence of their broken promises and unpaid debts. At the 
urging of the priest, that is, his followers realized that their very nature was 
corrupt, precisely to the extent that it was contaminated by primal instincts, 
bestial appetites, predatory urges, and animal vitality. With the help of the priest, 
that is, his followers detected within themselves an animal nature so flawed and 
defective that only divine sacrifice would provide adequate recompense (GM 
III:20).  
The priest subsequently deputized his followers, urging them to punish, 
tame, and eradicate their animal nature wherever and whenever it reared its ugly 
head. In doing so, of course, they once again directed their toxic ressentiment 
inward, though now with far greater force and intensity, and with no concern 
whatsoever for their own physiological wellbeing. Now availing himself of the 
“guilty” methods available to him for relieving the pain of his followers, the priest 
undertook to excite in them the “orgy of feeling” [Ausschweifung des Gefühls] 
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that is reserved for those who know themselves to be guilty (GM III:19). In 
exchange for regarding themselves as sinners and policing their animal urges, 
they were treated by the priest to an ecstatic experience of relief: 
To wrench the human soul from its moorings, to immerse it in terrors, 
ice, flames, and raptures to such an extent that it is liberated from all 
petty displeasure, gloom and depression as by a flash of 
lightning…(GM III:20) 
This is strong medicine, and we should be mindful of the severity of its side- and 
after-effects. The sick will be made sicker as a result, their nervous systems 
shattered in the process. Yet Nietzsche is quick to point out that the priest 
prescribes this medicine only with a “good conscience,” and only because he 
deems it “indispensable” to his efforts to maintain the herd (GM III:20).15  
Unbeknownst to his followers, they were mobilized in the process, 
programmed to wreak havoc on all those who enjoyed or flaunted or even 
displayed their animal vitality. Of primary interest to the priest was the herd’s 
orchestrated assault on his sworn enemies, those knightly nobles who had 
ordered him to mind the slaves in the first place.16 With the blessing of the priest, 
and armed with a freshly minted morality of their own, his followers made it their 
business to hector the knightly nobles and apprise them of their resident evil. 
Over the course of what may have been years or decades or even centuries, the 
knightly nobles came to see themselves as evil, and precisely to the extent that 
they indulged their predatory impulses and appetites. As the knightly nobles 
became self-critical, hesitant, unsure, and self-divided, the priest claimed his 
revenge.   
As Nietzsche allows, in fact, the nobles blundered most egregiously in 
their habitual failure to familiarize themselves with the tendencies and 
predilections of the slaves (GM I:10). Accustomed to shunting onto the priest the 
task of managing the lower orders of society, the knightly-aristocratic nobles 
were oblivious to the threat posed to them, potentially, by the slaves, criminals, 
parasites, and outlaws who populated these lower orders. In particular, Nietzsche 
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explains, the knightly-aristocratic nobles remained fatally ignorant of the 
explosive capacity of the ressentiment that was accumulated by the slaves and 
weaponized by the priest.  
The important point for the purposes of our comparison is that the ascetic 
priest discovered how to weaponize the ressentiment that he earlier had 
discovered how to redirect. Having done so, of course, he boosted the dosage of 
affect-medication that he earlier had prescribed to form the herd. Increasingly 
dependent on the ecstatic experiences that attended their recognition of their 
sinfulness, his followers were in no position to protest or complain, even though 
the increased dosage they craved caused them irreparable physiological 
damage.  
Part Five:  Resenting Abraham 
Why is the return of the priest relevant to our profile of Johannes de silentio? 
According to me, a similar development takes place in Problema III of Fear and 
Trembling. Having flattered his readers and curried their favor, Johannes 
encourages them to find moral fault with Abraham, who apparently lied to Isaac 
when asked about the animal they would sacrifice. Johannes proceeds in this 
fashion, or so I offer, because he has grown resentful of Abraham and weary of 
the obligation to aspire to the faith of Abraham. He thus recruits his favored 
readers to deliver a moral indictment that he, Johannes, cannot directly issue. If 
Abraham could be shown or even alleged to have mistreated Isaac, and if his 
faith could be presented as licensing this mistreatment, Johannes and his mates 
need not feel burdened by the expectation to “go further.” No longer tempted or 
shamed by Abraham’s achievement, they may relax into the “happiness of ‘slight 
superiority’” that awaits them in the revitalized ethical sphere.  
Keen to cast off the role he has played thus far, that of the unworthy 
encomiast, Johannes finally spies an opening. As he nears what would become 
the conclusion of Problema III, he steers the narrative toward a consideration of 
Abraham’s famous promise of divine providence (Gen. 22:8). His pretext for 
doing so is reasonable enough, even if other motives are also in evidence. As we 
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know, he has attempted in the Problemata to isolate the faith of Abraham by 
experimentally modeling him on the “knight of faith.” If Abraham could be shown 
to fit the evolving profile of the “knight of faith,” or so Johannes supposes, we 
finally might come to understand Abraham in the fullness of his faith.17 An 
obvious impediment to this approach, however, is Johannes’ insistence that the 
“knight of faith” is always radically alone in his faith and unable to communicate 
with mortal others. If Abraham was in fact a “knight of faith,” then it cannot be the 
case that he spoke to anyone, even if the biblical verses indicate otherwise. As a 
result, Johannes must take care to nullify or explain away Abraham’s promise of 
divine providence. 
Johannes thus returns our attention to the exchange recorded at Gen. 
22:8-9, where Isaac directly asks Abraham about the animal to be prepared for 
sacrifice. “God will provide the lamb for the burnt offering,” Abraham famously 
replied. Although Abraham appears to mislead Isaac at Gen. 22:8, which would 
suggest his indifference to the moral law, Johannes begs to differ.18 In fact, he 
maintains, Abraham spoke “ironically,” in a “divine language,” and in a “strange 
tongue” (FT 118-19).19 According to Johannes, that is, Abraham did not mislead 
Isaac, for the utterance in question in fact conveyed nothing at all. Despite all 
appearances, then, Abraham did not really say to Isaac what the biblical narrator 
records at Gen. 22:8. As such, Abraham did not conceal his aims from Isaac, for 
speaking ironically is not to be confused with speaking untruthfully.20  
Here we should note, moreover, that Johannes has managed to score a 
double victory with his creative interpretation of the biblical verses in question:  
1) Abraham did not speak, which means that we may continue in our efforts 
to measure his fit to the profile of the “knight of faith”; and  
2) Because Abraham did not speak, his promise of divine providence 
cannot be construed as having concealed his aims from Isaac. As a result, 
no “ethical justification” of this concealment, as specified in the title of 
Problema III, is needed. The fact that Johannes can provide no such 
justification thus becomes irrelevant.21 
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Abraham is thus cleared of all charges, albeit on the strength of a dubious 
technicality. Although Johannes succeeds thereby in salvaging his campaign to 
fit Abraham to the profile of the “knight of faith,” however, he shows little interest 
in continuing this thought-experiment. In fact, he appears to be finished, at least 
for now. 
I have surveyed elsewhere the various difficulties involved in this far-
fetched appeal to the irony of Abraham.22 For our present purposes, let us 
acknowledge the ulterior motives that are likely to have influenced this appeal. As 
we have seen, Johannes’ concern with the biblical verses in question is neither 
gratuitous nor outrageous. In light of his interest in modeling Abraham on the 
“knight of faith,” in fact, he must address what appears to be a genuine, 
substantive exchange between Abraham and Isaac. We may wonder, however, 
why he adopts this particular approach to the task of addressing their exchange.  
His decision to linger over the biblical verses in question affords him the 
opportunity to communicate indirectly with his favored readers, those whom he 
has taken care to flatter and cajole throughout his narration of Fear and 
Trembling. What he communicates to them, I submit, is his sense of moral 
outrage, which may or may not be genuine, pertaining to Abraham’s promise of 
divine providence. As we know, he goes so far as to remind his readers of what 
Abraham might have said in response to Isaac’s question: You are the one 
intended (FT 118).23 Without saying so, that is, Johannes all but accuses 
Abraham of a gratuitous and potentially cruel prevarication. Johannes eventually 
exonerates Abraham, as we have seen, but not before sowing the seeds of 
distrust in the minds of his favored readers.  
 Why would Johannes proceed in this fashion? As I have suggested, 
Johannes has grown resentful of Abraham and weary of praising his prodigious 
faith. So long as Abraham stands before him as an exemplar of faith, there 
always will be more that he might (and should) be expected to do to secure the 
terms of his salvation. In other words, Johannes is now hoist on his own petard: 
Having urged his contemporaries to reconsider the faith of Abraham, precisely so 
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that they would appreciate the spiritual poverty of their strictly ethical existence, 
he now labors under the burden of a similar estimation of his own life. So long as 
he feels spiritually inadequate in comparison to Abraham, he cannot take full 
advantage of the infusion of passion and vitality that he has prescribed. Like his 
contemporaries, of course, he could respond to this provocation by resolving to 
follow in the extra-ethical footsteps of Abraham. Like them, however, he has no 
intention of doing so. 
The problem Johannes encounters here is that his renewed attention to 
the faith of Abraham has served its purpose, allowing him to assert his “slight 
superiority” vis-à-vis his contemporaries, and it has exhausted its utility. 
Johannes is done with Abraham and now wishes to return him to his former 
position of obscure, non-threatening, ceremonial significance. Simply put, 
Johannes needs Abraham to be gone so that he can enjoy the comparative 
advantage he has arranged for himself and his mates in the ethical sphere. So 
long as he feels either tempted or shamed by the faith of Abraham, he will be 
unable to enjoy “the happiness of ‘slight superiority’” that he has secured for 
himself and his favored readers. It is for this reason that he endeavors in 
Problema III to cast aspersions on Abraham’s character, focusing in particular on 
Abraham’s duplicitous promise of divine providence. Having exhorted his 
contemporaries to revisit the faith of Abraham, he now needs his favored readers 
to return Abraham to his customary (and mostly harmless) position of merely 
ceremonial significance.  
The difficulty he faces is that he cannot come right out and directly accuse 
Abraham of lying. Doing so would be contrary to the encomia he has issued and, 
therefore, destructive of the renewed passion and vitality these encomia were 
meant to excite. As a knight of morality, moreover, he is obliged to praise 
Abraham and maintain the appearance of his greatness, as he has done 
consistently throughout Fear and Trembling. At the same time, however, he 
enjoys sufficient latitude to defend Abraham while also calling into question his 
character. And this is precisely what he attempts to accomplish as he nears the 
end of Problema III. Much as the ascetic priest contrives to mobilize his formerly 
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docile herd, so Johannes attempts to turn his favored readers against Abraham, 
trading on and amplifying the suspicions they already harbor with respect to his 
journey to Mt. Moriah.  
It is no coincidence that Johannes encourages his best readers to identify 
sympathetically with the victimized Isaac, whose treatment throughout this “trial” 
is difficult for anyone to justify or defend. 24 By focusing on the apparent 
mistreatment of Isaac, Johannes aims to drive a wedge between Abraham’s 
religious status—viz., as a divine favorite—and his ethical status—viz., as a 
father and caregiver. His objective in doing so is to furnish himself and his best 
readers with a credible pretext both for their failure to aspire to the faith of 
Abraham and for their resentment of anyone who dares to “go further.” Those 
who follow in the extra-moral footsteps of Abraham, he thus implies, do so at the 
expense of their ethical obligations and, possibly, of their humanity. So although 
Johannes and his favored readers wish they could “go further,” or so they will 
claim from the safety of the ethical sphere, they could not bear to treat others as 
cruelly as Abraham treated Isaac.  
As presented by Johannes, the steadfast resolve of Abraham is the 
source of both his greatness and his immorality. If Abraham can be shown to 
have achieved his faith at the expense of his most basic ethical obligations, then 
Johannes and his readers may refuse, on identifiably ethical grounds, to aspire to 
the faith of Abraham. Having done so, they may relax into “the happiness of 
‘slight superiority’” that Johannes has arranged for them in the ethical sphere. 
They will do so, of course, under the aegis of a self-deception or inauthenticity 
that Kierkegaard fears is becoming pandemic throughout late modern European 
culture.25 While it is true that they have neither achieved nor even aspired 
sincerely to the faith of Abraham, the “choice” they have made—namely, to side 
with Isaac and hold Abraham responsible for his ethical lapse—serves to diffuse 
any feelings of guilt or inadequacy that otherwise might temper their enjoyment of 
their (merely) ethical existence. Indeed, here we are reminded of the central role 
played in the slave revolt in morality by the fiction of the slaves’ supposed choice 
to suffer at the hands of their oppressors. This fiction not only allowed the slaves 
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to experience their suffering as meaningful, but also poisoned the nobles’ 
enjoyment of the cruelty they visited upon the slaves.  
A signal advantage of this interpretation of Problema III is the insight it 
grants us into the divided office that Johannes is obliged to perform. As a knight 
of morality, he simultaneously must defend both Abraham and the moral law that 
Abraham is believed, in some sense, to have authorized. For the most part, to be 
sure, his performance of this divided office is neither constraining nor onerous. 
Abraham is generally, if vaguely, admirable, and few individuals are inclined to 
dwell for long on the ethical implications of his journey to Moriah. (As we know 
from the Preliminary Expectoration, moreover, very few preachers will encourage 
their congregants to examine closely Abraham’s decision to offer his “best” to his 
God.) (FT 28) For his part, Johannes routinely praises Abraham, while judiciously 
stopping short of endorsing his extra-ethical allegiances. Should anyone feel 
called to emulate Abraham, moreover, Johannes vows to do everything in his 
power to head off a return trip to Moriah (FT 31-33).  In other words, he is 
ordinarily able to strike a viable balance between praising Abraham and 
condoning Abraham’s journey to Moriah.  
When none other than Abraham is perceived to have offended the moral 
law, however, the burden of performing this divided office becomes nearly 
unbearable. Like the feckless preacher who unwittingly incited a sleepless 
congregant, Johannes must attempt to honor competing obligations that he 
simply cannot reconcile. Like the preacher, moreover, Johannes arrives at a 
solution that verges on the comic.26 As we have seen, his defense of Abraham’s 
“ironic” promise to Isaac not only strains credulity, but also permits him indirectly 
to communicate his sense of moral outrage.  
In his defense of Abraham’s promise of divine providence, Johannes 
executes the double movement that is emblematic of his station.27 First, he 
moves decisively to defend the priority of the ethical sphere, dutifully pointing out 
that Abraham misled Isaac about the objective of their journey. To be sure, he 
forwards this allegation “dialectically,” thereby distancing himself from the moral 
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judgment that the allegation is likely to motivate. Still, the important point here is 
that the knight of morality cannot let this offense pass without comment. In 
lingering over the particulars of Abraham’s promise of divine providence, in fact, 
Johannes indirectly communicates his disapproval to his best readers, who are 
expected in turn to issue the moral condemnation that he can only suggest. Like 
Tarquin the proud (FT 3), that is, Johannes relies on an indirect communication 
to order a hit. In this case, the ill-fated poppies represent Abraham, whom 
Johannes’ best readers are meant to disavow as a moral exemplar. Thus 
liberated from any obligation to aspire to the faith of Abraham, he and they may 
partake of the “happiness of ‘slight superiority” that the revitalized ethical sphere 
sponsors.  
Second, Johannes moves expeditiously to defend Abraham, the 
acknowledged progenitor of the ethical sphere, from the taint of immorality. This 
second movement is especially difficult for him to execute, for he must deflect the 
charge of immorality that he has prompted his readers to bring against Abraham. 
Johannes responds, as we have seen, by appealing in lawyerly fashion to the 
irony of Abraham, which, he explains, ensures that Isaac received as gibberish 
the words recorded by the narrator of Genesis. A further difficulty, of course, is 
that Johannes is no longer inclined to defend Abraham. In order to enjoy the 
“happiness of ‘slight superiority’” that he has arranged for himself and his favored 
readers, he needs a convincing pretext for his refusal to “go further.” The pretext 
of choice, as we have seen, is the assertion that the faith of Abraham licensed 
his cruel treatment of Isaac.  
We should not be surprised, that is, if his defense of Abraham (i.e., his 
second movement) is noticeably less elegant, and decidedly less persuasive, 
than his defense of the ethical sphere (i.e., his first movement). Like the ascetic 
priest, we know, Johannes chafes under the limitations of the social role to which 
he has been assigned. The explanation he proffers is thus meant to serve double 
duty: With a single stroke, he both defends Abraham and enjoins his favored 
readers to dismiss Abraham as a moral monster.  
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A final advantage of this interpretation lies in the sense it allows us to 
make of the logical and narrative devolution that faults the concluding paragraphs 
of Problema III. Simply put, the double-movement performed by Johannes 
overwhelms and deranges the investigation underway in Problema III. Rather 
than celebrate or leverage his successful defense of Abraham, who did not 
deceive Isaac after all, Johannes effectively abandons the project of fitting 
Abraham to the profile of the “knight of faith.”28 Ostensibly concerned to 
determine if it was ethically defensible for Abraham to conceal his undertaking 
from Sarah, Eliezer, and Isaac, Johannes instead contrives to change the 
subject. He ventures no answer to the question he poses to himself, and he 
concludes Problema III by revisiting the conclusion of Problema II (120). In his 
haste to steer Problema III toward something resembling a proper conclusion, 
moreover, he appeals gratuitously to the all-seeing, tear-counting God of 
Matthew’s Gospel, as if his readers would need to be reminded of this God’s 
panoptic interest in them.29  
Conclusion 
By way of closing, let us acknowledge what might be called the social utility of 
resentment. As we have seen, the “happiness of ‘slight superiority’” will content 
Johannes and his readers only if they are relieved of any temptation or 
requirement to “go further.” Otherwise, their delight in looking down on their 
contemporaries will be dampened, or counterbalanced, by their palpable failure 
to achieve faith in their own right. Rather than compare themselves to distant, 
enigmatic figures like Abraham, which invariably would dilute their experience of 
happiness, Johannes’s readers will follow his lead and disqualify all such figures 
from serious consideration. Indeed, it is his duty, as a knight of morality, to hold 
Abraham in strategic abeyance, such that his prodigious faith is neither 
permanently “lost” to us, nor a distraction from our pursuit of the petty pleasures 
afforded us within the sprawling empire of bourgeois Christendom.  	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